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I. INTRODUCTION
Rule 60(b)' is an attempt to codify the equitable, common law
practice of reforming judgments under special circumstances. 2 The
rule, inter alia, authorizes a court to relieve a party from a default
judgment for "excusable neglect."3 This standard, however, is not
defined in the rules, and courts have struggled with its meaning.
Some circuits define the term liberally and often grant requests to
vacate default judgments. 4 Others adopt a strict interpretation and
consistently refuse to vacate default judgments resulting from mere
carelessness or negligence. 5 Recently, in Pioneer Investment Services
Co. v. Brunswick Associates Ltd. Partnership,6 the Supreme Court
clarified the term "excusable neglect" under one of the Bankruptcy
Rules. Given the differing goals and policies of default judgments and
bankruptcies, as well as the internal problems of the decision itself,
1. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) provides in pertinent part:
(b) Mistakes; Inadvertence; Excusable Neglect; Newly Discovered Evidence; Fraud, etc.
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or a party's
legal representative from a final judgment, order or proceeding for the following reasons:
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence
which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial
under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic),
misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5)
the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which
it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the
judgment should have prospective application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief
from the operation of the judgment.
F.R.C.P. 60(b).
2. Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller and Mary K. Kane, 11 Federal Practice and
Procedure § 2851 at 227 (West, 2d ed. 1995).
3. F.R.C.P. 60(b)(1) (authorizing a court to relieve a party for "mistake, inadvertence,
surprise, or excusable neglect"). Although Rule 60(b) authorizes a court to relieve a party from
any "final judgment, order, or proceedingL,]" this Note focuses only on the interpretation of
"excusable neglect" in the context of default judgments.
4. See, for example, Meadows v. Dominican Republic, 817 F.2d 517, 521-22 (9th Cir. 1987)
(stating that circuit law is to vacate default judgments except upon a showing of culpable
conduct, prejudice to the non-moving party, or the lack of a meritorious defense); Gross v. Stereo
Component Systems, Inc., 700 F.2d 120, 124 (3rd Cir. 1983) (vacating a default judgment because
neither the party nor its counsel had engaged in willful conduct).
5. See, for example, Pelican Production Corp. v. Marino, 893 F.2d 1143, 1146 (10th Cir.
1990) (stating that carelessness by a party or her counsel does not afford a basis for relief from a
default judgment); Hough v. Local 134, Intl. Brotherhood of Electric Workers, 867 F.2d 1018, 1022
(7th Cir. 1989) (stating that neither ignorance nor carelesness will provide grounds for relief
under Rule 60(b)(1)); Sutherland v. 1TT Contintental Baking Co., Inc., 710 F.2d 473, 476-77 (8th
Cir. 1983) (holding neither attorney incompetence nor carelessness is a basis for relief under
Rule 60(b)(1)); Guess?, Inc. v. Chang, 163 F.R.D. 505, 508 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (stating that attorney
negligence can never afford a basis for relief under excusable neglect).
6. 507 U.S. 380 (1993). In Pioneer, the Supreme Court liberally defined "excusable
neglect" in the context of Bankruptcy Rule 9006(b). See id. at 388.
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however, the decision should not be extended to determinations of
excusable neglect under Rule 60(b)(1).
Part II of this Note examines the history of Rule 60(b),
analyzing the background and source of original Rule 60(b), as well as
the subsequent amendments to the rule. In addition, Part II describes
the construction and application of Rule 60(b), outlining the remedial
nature of the rule and the competing policy concerns of finality of
judgments versus the preference for deciding cases on the merits.
Part III discusses the inconsistent interpretations of "excusable
neglect" under Rule 60(b)(1) in cases concerning mere carelessness or
negligence. This section explores why some circuits consistently
vacate default judgments except upon a showing of culpable conduct or
bad faith, while other circuits refuse to vacate default judgments
occurring as a result of mere carelessness or negligence. Part IV
examines both the majority approach in the Pioneer decision and the
dissent's concerns, paying particular attention to internal
inconsistencies in the majority opinion. Finally, Part V addresses the
inapplicability of Pioneer to the determination of excusable neglect
under Rule 60(b)(1). The Note concludes that courts should adopt a
strict interpretation of "excusable neglect" and refuse to condone mere
carelessness or negligence under Rule 60(b)(1).
II. HISTORY AND CONSTRUCTION OF RULE 60(b)
A. Source and Background of Rule 60(b)
Prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a
court had the power to grant relief from a final judgment primarily
during the term in which the judgment was entered.7 Otherwise,
relief was available only in limited circumstances,8 through a process
admittedly "shrouded in ancient lore and mystery."9 The procedures
were so inflexible that many courts established local rules extending
7. Wright, Miller and Kane, 11 Federal Practice & Procedure § 2851 at 228 (cited in note
2).
8. Exceptions to the general rule were available through the use of the ancillary and
equitable writs of bill of review, bill in the nature of a bill of review, coram nobis, coram vobis,
and audita querela. These writs were designed to provide relief in limited situations after the
term of court had expired. James W. Moore, 7 Moore's Federal Practice 60.09 at 60-65
(Matthew Bender, 2nd ed. 1996).
9. F.R.C.P. 60(b) advisory committee's note to 1946 amendment.
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the term of court for a specified time from the entry of final judgment,
to allow sufficient time for requests for relief.1°
In response to this inflexible situation, the Supreme Court's
Advisory Committee formulated Rule 60(b).11 In the rule's original
form, the committee stated that the only basis for relief was "mistake,
inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect."2 The rule also contained
a provision that it "[did] not limit the power of a court.. to entertain
an action to relieve a party from a judgment, order, or proceeding."13
This provision preserved the old ancillary and equitable remedies and
allowed a court to grant relief on grounds other than those specifically
listed in the rule.1
4
Since 1937, Rule 60(b) has been amended three separate
times. 15 The primary changes abolished the old ancillary and equita-
ble remedies, 6 enlarged the stated grounds for relief,17 and eliminated
the qualifying pronoun "his" from the rule so as to include the mis-
take, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect of others as a basis
for relief. 8 The rule, as it now reads, contains six clauses and lists
fourteen grounds on which a party may base a motion for relief.19
10. Moore, 7 Moore's Federal Practice 60.09 at 60-66 (cited in note 8).
11. Id.
12. Rule 60(b), as originally promulgated, read in pertinent part as follows: "On motion the
court, upon such terms as are just, may relieve a party or his legal representative from a
judgment, order or proceeding taken against him through his mistake, inadvertence, surprise or
excusable neglect." F.R.C.P. 60(b) as adopted in 1937. The original source for the rule was § 473
of the California Code of Civil Procedure, which read, in part, as follows: "The court may, upon
such terms as may be just, relieve a party or his legal representative from a judgment, order, or
other proceeding taken against him through his mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable
neglect Moore, 7 Moore's Federal Practice 60.10[5] at 60-71 (cited in note 8).
13. F.R.C.P. 60(b) as adopted in 1937.
14. See Moore, 7 Moore's Federal Practice 60.09 at 60-68 (cited in note 8) (asserting that
original Rule 60(b) preserved the common law and equitable ancillary remedies); James Win.
Moore and Elizabeth B. A. Rogers, Federal Relief from Civil Judgments, 55 Yale L. J. 623, 633
(1946) (stating that the rule preserved ancillary actions); Wright, Miller and Kane, 11 Federal
Practice & Procedure § 2851 at 228 (cited in note 2) (stating that the old ancillary remedies were
still available).
15. Rule 60 was amended December 27, 1946, effective March 19, 1948; December 29,
1948, effective October 20, 1949; and March 2, 1987, effective August 1, 1987. F.R.C.P. 60.
16. F.R.C.P. 60(b) as adopted in 1946. See, for example, Bankers Mortgage Co. v. United
States, 423 F.2d 73, 78 (5th Cir. 1970) (stating that the rule specifically abolished ancillary writs
and remedies); West Va. Oil & Gas Co., Inc. v. George E. Breece Lumber, 213 F.2d 702, 705 (5th
Cir. 1954) (asserting that the rule abolished common law writs); In re Brown, 68 F.R.D. 172, 174
(D.D.C. 1975) (stating that the rule expressly abolished ancillary and equitable remedies). See
also Wright, Miller and Kane, 11 Federal Practice & Procedure § 2851 at 229 (cited in note 2)
(explaining that the amended rule expressly abolished the old ancillary and equitable remedies).
17. The 1946 Amendment to Rule 60(b)(1) enlarged the stated grounds for relief to include,
for example, fraud and newly discovered evidence that was previously undiscoverable. Moore, 7
Moore's Federal Practice 60.15[8] at 60-114 to 60-115 (cited in note 8).
18. F.R.C.P. 60(b) advisory committee's note to the 1946 amendment.
19. See note 1.
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B. Construction and Application of Rule 60(b)
When formulating Rule 60(b), the drafters took into account
such factors as the desirability of this type of remedy, the need for
finality, the preference for deciding cases on the merits, and the desire
that justice be accomplished.20 While, in the drafters' view, the
adopted rule struck a proper balance with regard to these often-com-
peting concerns, 21 courts were left with little guidance as to how to
apply the rule so as to best effectuate the drafters' intent. Since origi-
nal Rule 60(b) had been modeled after Section 473 of the California
Code of Civil Procedure,22 early decisions looked to California cases for
guidance.2
3
California courts interpreting Section 473 of the California
Code had recognized it as being remedial in nature and requiring a
liberal construction.2 4 Accordingly, courts granted relief from default
judgments in cases in which the party seeking relief from a judgment
relied upon another party's promises to defend his interests;25 in which
a party with a substantial defense inadvertently allowed a default;
26
and in which counsel did not file an answer as a result of his firm's
overwhelming business and the absence of one of its members.
27
California courts did not excuse all conduct, however, and denied
relief, in cases in which the defendant failed to appear because of
negligence of counsel;28 in which counsel claimed to be in poor health
20. See Moore, 7 Moore's Federal Practice 60.09 at 60-65 (cited in note 8) (discussing the
factors the Advisory Committee took into account when formulating the rule).
21. See Wright, Miller and Kane, 11 Federal Practice & Procedure § 2581 at 227 (cited in
note 2) (explaining the drafters' attempt to strike a proper balance among competing policy
concerns).
22. See note 12 and accompanying text. When a statute is adopted in substantially the
same language as a statute from another jurisdiction, courts generally construe the adopted
provisions according to their construction in the other jurisdiction at the time the new statute
was adopted. Metropolitan Railroad Co. v. Moore, 121 U.S. 558, 572 (1887).
23. Moore, 7 Moore's Federal Practice 60.10[7] at 60-75 (cited in note 8); Wright, Miller
and Kane, 11 Federal Practice & Procedure § 2852 at 232-33 (cited in note 2).
24. See, for example, Nicoll v. Weldon, 130 Cal. 666, 63 P. 63, 64 (1900) (asserting that
§ 473 of the California Code of Civil Procedure is remedial in nature and should be construed
liberally so as to decide cases on the merits); Melde v. Reynolds, 129 Cal. 308, 61 P. 932, 933
(1900) (stating that § 473 is remedial in nature and should be liberally construed); Williams v.
McQueen, 89 Cal. App. 659, 265 P. 339, 340 (1928) (holding that § 473 of the California Code of
Civil Procedure is remedial in nature and should be liberally construed).
25. Sofuye v. Pieters- Wheeler Seed Co., 62 Cal. App. 198, 216 P. 990 (1923).
26. Staley v. O7Day, 22 Cal. App. 149, 133 P. 620 (1913).
27. Carbondale Machine Co. v. Eyraud, 94 Cal. App. 356, 271 P. 349 (1928).
28. United States v. Duesdieker, 118 Cal. App. 723, 5 P.2d 916 (1931).
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and under extreme pressure at work;29 and in which an attorney negli-
gently believed that an amended complaint had been filed by mail.30
Federal judges looked to these opinions for guidance when rendering
their own decisions in early cases applying Rule 60(b).31
With the passage of time, the body of federal precedent inter-
preting Rule 60(b) began to grow and California case law became
much less significant.2 Even as federal judges became increasingly
comfortable construing Rule 60(b), however, certain provisions within
the rule continued to pose problems. One of the more significant is
60(b)(1), which authorizes a court to relieve a party from a judgment
for "excusable neglect.' 3 This term is not defined in the rules, and
courts have struggled with its meaning.
III. INCONSISTENT INTERPRETATIONS OF "EXCUSABLE NEGLECT"
UNDER RULE 60(b)(1)
A. The Liberal Standard: Circuits that Vacate Default Judgments
Except Upon a Showing of Culpable Conduct or Bad Faith
Although the circuits all agree that a court should deny relief
under Rule 60(b)(1) in cases in which a party's affirmative strategic
decision resulted in a default judgment,3 the courts are otherwise
divided over the appropriate scope of "excusable neglect." Several
circuits take the stance that a court should vacate a default judgment
29. Berendsen v. Babdaty, 62 Cal. App. 185, 216 P. 385 (1923).
30. Doyle v. Rice Ranch Oil Co., 28 Cal. App. 2d 18, 81 P.2d 980 (1938).
31. See, for example, United States v. Mutual Construction Corp., 3 F.R.D. 227, 227-28
(E.D. Pa. 1943) (looking to Williams, 265 P. at 339, in granting relief when counsel in New York,
as a result of his full-time assignment as Special -Assistant to the Attorney General of the United
States, failed to obtain counsel in Pennsylvania to file an answer); Ledwith v. Storkan, 2 F.R.D.
539, 542-43 (D. Neb. 1942) (referring to California case law holding that the pressure of other
business is inadequate to show excusable neglect as the basis for denying relief when counsel
claimed his failure to file an answer was caused by other business and his absence from the
jurisdiction).
32. Wright, Miller and Kane, 11 Federal Practice & Procedure § 2852 at 233 (cited in note
2).
33. F.R.C.P. 60(b)(1) (authorizing a court to relieve a party from a judgment for "mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect").
34. See, for example, United States v. Erdoss, 440 F.2d 1221, 1223 (2nd Cir. 1971) (denying
relief when a party made a strategic decision to default); Lloyd v. Carnation Co., 101 F.R.D. 346,
348 (M.D.N.C. 1984) (stating that the rule was not designed to relieve a party from a strategic
decision that in hindsight appeared improvident); United States v. 1,550.44 Acres of Land, 369
F. Supp. 1078, 1079 (D.N.D. 1974) (asserting that excusable neglect does not include counsel's
affirmative tactical decisions).
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except upon a showing of willful or culpable conduct or bad faith on
the part of the movant.3 5 These courts focus primarily on the policy
preferences of deciding cases on the merits and construing Rule
60(b)(1) liberally so as to accomplish justice.3
6
Recently, in American Alliance Insurance Co. v. Eagle
Insurance Co.,31 the Second Circuit vacated a default judgment that
resulted from a filing error committed by a clerk for in-house counsel.
In reaching its decision, the court focused on whether the default was
the result of "willful" conduct." Although the lawyer had not discov-
ered the misfiling for two months, the court stated that, because the
act was merely one of carelessness or negligence, the harsh applica-
tion of a default judgment was inappropriate.3 9 A default judgment,
according to the court, should be entered only in the event of either
deliberate conduct or bad faith, neither of which was present here.40
Although the court acknowledged the need for expediting litigation, it
asserted that public policy favored deciding cases on the merits when-
ever possible.
41
The Third Circuit used an almost identical standard in vacat-
ing a default judgment in Gross v. Stereo Component Systems.4 In
35. The Second, Third, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits consistently follow such an approach. See
notes 4, 37-64 and accompanying text. Although the courts may consider other factors such as
whether the defendant has a meritorious defense and whether the non-defaulting party would be
prejudiced if the default were set aside, ultimately the nature of the defaulting party's conduct
determines the result. See notes 38, 47, 50, 55 and accompanying text.
36. See, for example, Meadows, 817 F.2d at 521 (stating that Rule 60(b) is remedial in
nature and should be applied liberally so as to decide cases on the merits when possible);
Wagstaff-EL v. Carlton Press Co., 913 F.2d 56, 57-58 (2nd Cir. 1990) (vacating default judgment
after weighing all relevant factors); United Coin Meter Co. v. Seaboard Coastline Railroad, 705
F.2d 839, 846 (6th Cir. 1983) (stating that federal courts favor trial on the merits); Farnese v.
Bagnasco, 687 F.2d 761, 764 (3rd Cir. 1982) (stating doubts should be resolved in favor of decid-
ing cases on the merits).
37. 92 F.3d 57 (2nd Cir. 1996). Office custom was for the clerk to log the pleadings when
received and then to assign the case to an attorney. In this particular case, however, the
pleadings were accidentally removed from the clerk's desk before being logged and placed in a
related case's file. Id. at 59.
38. The Second Circuit, in determining whether to vacate a default judgment, examines
"(1) whether the default was willful; (2) whether [the] defendant has a meritorious defense; and
(3) the level of prejudice that may occur to the non-defaulting party if relief is granted." Id. at 59
(quoting Davis v. Musler, 713 F.2d 907, 915 (2nd Cir. 1983)).
39. Id. at 61-62. The court did recognize, however, that the degree of the moving party's
gross negligence or carelessness is a relevant factor in determining whether to extend relief. Id.
40. By subjectively examining the willfulness of the party's behavior, cases concerning
excusable neglect are separated from those in which the neglect is inexcusable. Id. Here,
although the conduct was grossly negligent, it was neither "willful, deliberate [n]or in bad faith."
Id.
41. Id.
42. 700 F.2d 120 (3rd Cir. 1983).
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:1619
Gross, the defendant claimed the default had resulted from a break-
down in communication between the defendant's general counsel in
Boston and local counsel in Philadelphia.41 The District Court refused
to extend relief, stating that local counsel should have checked the
public record or contacted the defendant to ascertain when the com-
plaint had been served." Because she had not, her failure to answer
was not excusable neglect.45 The Third Circuit, however, placed pri-
mary importance on the fact that local counsel had been "actively
attempting to contact" the defendant's general counsel. 46
Consequently, the court failed to find evidence of willfulness or bad
faith and granted the motion to set aside the judgment on the basis of
excusable neglect.47
In contrast, in Amernational Industries v. Action-Tungsram,
Inc.," the Sixth Circuit focused not on whether the defendant had
engaged in "willful conduct" that resulted in the entry of a default
judgment, but instead on whether the defendant's "culpable conduct"49
resulted in the default judgment.50 According to the court, such an
inquiry is warranted given the drastic nature of a default judgment
and the desire to apply Rule 60(b) liberally.5' While acknowledging
that the defendant's repeated failures to comply with discovery
requests and to pay court-imposed sanctions did not represent the
conduct of a model litigant,52 the court held that his conduct did not
43. Id. at 121-22.
44. Id. at 122.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 124.
47. Id. The court also noted that the plaintiff would not be prejudiced by opening the
default judgment and that it was unprepared to say that the defense was "facially
unmeritorious" Id. at 123.
48. 925 F.2d 970 (6th Cir. 1991).
49. While the distinction between "willful conduct" and "culpable conduct" is not entirely
clear, according to the court, for conduct to rise to the level of "culpable" for purposes of a motion
to vacate a default judgment, the "conduct of a defendant must display either an intent to thwart
judicial proceedings or a reckless disregard for the effect of its conduct on those proceedings" Id.
at 978 (quoting INVST Financial Group, Inc. v. Chem-Nuclear Systems, Inc., 815 F.2d 391, 399
(6th Cir. 1987)).
50. Id. at 976. The court also considered whether the defendant had a meritorious defense
and whether the plaintiff would be prejudiced if the judgment were vacated. Id.
51. Id.
52. The plaintiff had filed motions for default judgments three separate times: (1) in June
1987, for the defendant's failure to appear at two status conferences scheduled by the district
court, (2) in March 1989, for the defendant's failure to pay court-imposed sanctions that had
resulted from the June 1987 motion and for failure to produce documents, and (3) in June 1989,
for the defendant's continued failure to produce documents. The district court granted this third
motion for entry of a default judgment. Id. at 972-73.
1626
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rise to the level of culpability.53 As a result, the Sixth Circuit vacated
the default judgment and granted relief.
54
The Ninth Circuit's application of the culpability standard is
not nearly as forgiving. Although the Ninth Circuit courts also use a
culpability analysis in determining whether to vacate a default
judgment on the basis of excusable neglect,'5 its standard for assessing
culpability is much stricter. For example, in Associated Business
Telephone. System Corp. v. Cohn,56 a district court refused to vacate a
default judgment, explaining that under Ninth Circuit law, conduct is
considered culpable when a party receives actual or constructive
notice of a filing and fails to respond, regardless of the surrounding
circumstances. 57 Thus, if the moving party had actual or constructive
notice of the filing, the party is penalized, and relief under Rule 60(b)
is denied.5 8 Since the plaintiff in Associated Business Telephone
System had actual notice and failed to comply with numerous
deadlines, 59 the court found the conduct culpable. 60 Although the court
53. Id. at 978. The court considered relevant such factors as a flood and subsequent move
that left the defendant's offices in disarray, the fact that the plaintiff had originally served the
discovery request on an entity other than the defendant, and the district court's failure in two in-
stances to provide the defendant with notice of significant events in the case. In the court's view,
the combined effect of these factors and the defendant's lack of reckless disregard for the conse-
quences of its actions constituted excusable neglect as contemplated under Rule 60(b)(1). Id.
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals claimed the enormity of the damage award in the default
judgment, $11,070,000 plus interest, attorney's fees and costs, strengthened this conclusion. Id.
54. Id. at 978-79.
55. In determining whether to vacate a default judgment, the Ninth Circuit examines (1)
whether the defendant's culpable conduct led to the default, (2) whether the defendant lacks a
meritorious defense, and (3) whether the plaintiff would be prejudiced if the default were set
aside. Meadows, 817 F.2d at 521. If any of these inquiries elicits an affirmative response, the
analysis ceases, and the motion to vacate is denied. See, for example, id. (holding that if the
default judgment is the result of culpable conduct, the court need not consider whether the
defendant possesses a meritorious defense or whether the plaintiff would be prejudiced); Benny v.
Pipes, 799 F.2d 489, 494 (9th Cir. 1986) (stating that the existence of culpable conduct halts the
analysis and the motion to vacate is denied); Pena v. Seguros La Comercial, S.A., 770 F.2d 811,
815 (9th Cir. 1984) (asserting that the existence of culpable conduct on the part of the defendant
renders additional analysis unnecessary).
56. 1995 WL 607545 (N.D. Cal.).
57. Id. at 3. See also Meadows, 817 F.2d at 521 (stating defendant's conduct is culpable
when he receives actual or constructive notice of a filing and fails to respond).
58. Associated Business Telephone System, 1995 WL 607545 at 3.
59. Plaintiff failed to comply with deadlines for filing an amended complaint, a third-
amended complaint, and a memorandum of opposition to defendants' motion to dismiss. Id. at 1-
2. In addition, after plaintiff indicated it would be changing counsel, the court requested that
plaintiff notify the court once new counsel had been obtained. The plaintiff never complied. Id.
60. The plaintiff attempted to justify its behavior by claiming it believed a settlement
agreement had been reached between the parties and that defendants would communicate this
fact to the court, rendering plaintiffs appearance and memorandum unnecessary. Id. at 4.
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acknowledged that Rule 60(b) should be liberally construed so as to
decide cases on the merits whenever possible,61 the court argued that a
failure to respond in the face of actual or constructive notice raises
questions concerning a party's good faith and leads to an inexcusable
waste of the court's time and resources. 62 Consequently, the district
court refused to extend relief, claiming such intentional and culpable
behavior is inexcusable under Rule 60(b)(1).63
The courts that examine the willfulness or culpability of a
party's actions to determine whether to vacate a default judgment
must assume that they are furthering the purpose behind Rule
60(b)(1) and the intent of the drafters.64 This assumption is question-
able given the circumstances under which Rule 60(b) was adopted, the
plain meaning of "excusable neglect" and other public policies the
American legal system has traditionally advanced.65 Such factors
have not escaped the circuits that take a more narrow approach to-
ward excusable neglect and refuse to vacate default judgments that
occur as a result of carelessness or negligence.
B. The Strict Standard: Circuits that Refuse to Vacate Default
Judgments Resulting from Mere
Carelessness or Negligence
Not all circuits agree that courts should liberally construe
excusable neglect so as to include errors occurring as a result of mere
carelessness or negligence. 66 Instead, some circuits define the term
narrowly and expressly reject requests to vacate default judgments
that result from mere carelessness or negligence. In C.K.S. Engineers,
Under Ninth Circuit precedent, however, a failure to respond is penalized regardless of the




64. While these courts do not generally make such an assertion directly, they do claim to
construe Rule 60(b)(1) in the manner in which it was intended, so as to best provide justice. See,
for example, American Alliance Insurance Co., 92 F.3d at 61 (holding that, because Rule 60(b)(1)
"expressly contemplates that some types of 'neglect' are 'excusable,'" the court must inquire into
the wilfullness of a party's default); United Coin Meter, 705 F.2d at 844-45 (quoting Blois v.
Friday, 612 F.2d 938, 940 (5th Cir. 1980)) ("A district court must apply Rule 60(b) 'equitably and
liberally... to achieve substantial justice.' ").
65. Most notably, other goals include ensuring finality of judgments, promoting judicial
efficiency, deterring inappropriate behavior and holding clients accountable for the sins of their
agents. See Part V.
66. The Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits consistently follow such an approach.
See notes 5, 67-85 and accompanying text.
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Inc. v. White Mountain Gypsum Co.,6 7 the Seventh Circuit refused to
vacate a default judgment that resulted from a breakdown in
attorney-client communications and a failure to obtain new counsel.68
While acknowledging the well-established preference for deciding
cases on the merits,6 9 the court stated that Rule 60(b)(1) relief from a
default judgment is an extraordinary remedy that should be extended
only on a showing of exceptional circumstances. 70 A party is incapable
of making such a showing when he has "willfully chosen not to conduct
[her] litigation with a degree of diligence and expediency prescribed by
the trial court.71 Consequently, careless or negligent behavior on the
part of an attorney or litigant can never be a basis for relief under the
Seventh Circuit's interpretation of the excusable neglect standard in
Rule 60(b)(1).
72
The Fifth Circuit uses a virtually identical standard for excus-
able neglect under Rule 60(b)(1) and refuses to set aside default judg-
ments occurring as a result of negligence or carelessness. 73  This
position derives from the view that Rule 60(b)(1) affords extraordinary'
relief that courts should only extend upon a showing of exceptional
67. 726 F.2d 1202 (7th Cir. 1984).
68. Id. at 1207-08. Defendants and their original counsel had communicated only two or
three times over the course of a year, and at least one of these conversations was limited to a dis-
cussion regarding the defendants' bill. Id. at 1207. Shortly after defendants' original counsel
obtained permission from the district court to withdraw from the case, defendants failed to
respond to plaintiffs interrogatories, despite the court's having granted them an extension. Id.
Consequently, the court entered a default judgment. Id. Defendants argued they failed to meet
this deadline as a result of lack of access to an attorney and lack of funds to hire one. Id. The
court was not persuaded, however, since one of the defendants had actually retained counsel and
the other had made no attempt to communicate his perceived problems to the court. Id. at 1207-
08 The circuit court found this behavior irresponsible and negligent and refused to extend relief
under Rule 60(b)(1). Id. at 1209.
69. Id. at 1205.
70. Although a default judgment is a harsh sanction to be used only in extreme cases, the
court stated that no reason exists for applying Rule 60(b) more liberally to default judgments
than to other types of judgments. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 1206. Relief in the Seventh Circuit is only available under Rule 60(b)(1) when
the default judgment occurred as a result of events not "within the meaningful control of the
defaulting party, or its attorney." Id. See also Carr v. Pouillous, S.A., 947 F. Supp. 393, 399
(C.D. Ill. 1996) (quoting Zuelzke Tool & Engineering Co., Inc. v. Anderson Die Castings, Inc., 925
F.2d 226, 229 (7th Cir. 1991)) ("[Wlhere a party willfully, albeit through ignorance or careless-
ness, abdicates its responsibilities, relief from judgment under Rule 60(b) is not warranted.").
73. See, for example, Lavespere v. Niagara Machine & Tool Works, Inc., 910 F.2d 167, 173
(5th Cir. 1990) (stating carelessness or negligence is not sufficient to warrant relief under Rule
60(b)(1)); United States v. Real Property Located at 165 Adelle St., Jackson, Mississippi, 850
F. Supp. 534, 538 (S.D. Miss. 1994) (stating that neglect by counsel is not enough to warrant
setting aside default judgment).
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circumstances.7 4  According to Fifth Circuit precedent, such a stan-
dard is necessitated by the need for finality of judgments and the
policy of holding clients accountable for the sins of their counsel in
civil litigation.75  As a result, courts in the Fifth Circuit have denied
relief under Rule 60(b)(1) when a moving party failed to institute
internal procedural safeguards in the course of business so as to pre-
vent having defaults taken against it;76 when a movant failed to open
certified mail containing service of process for three days before the
start of a two-week company-wide vacation;77 and when counsel told
his client to entrust a matter to him and then failed to comply with
local rules and deadlines.
78
In Pelican Production Corp. v. Marino,79 the Tenth Circuit held
that carelessness by a party or its counsel is not excusable neglect
under Rule 60(b)(1) ° and refused to vacate a default judgment occur-
ring as a result of the plaintiff attorney's failure to respond to a
motion to dismiss and a motion for summary judgment.sl Although
the plaintiff claimed it was unaware of the default judgment for
almost a month because of a breakdown in attorney-client
communication,8 2 the court was unsympathetic s In the court's view,
although default judgments are generally disfavored, the preference
for deciding cases on their merits must be weighed against
considerations of justice, expediency, and other social goals.8 Thus, in
a case in which the moving party failed to comply with the court's
74. To make such a showing, a party must have acted with constant diligence toward her
case. Pryor v. United States Postal Svc., 769 F.2d 281, 286-87 (5th Cir. 1985).
75. See, for example, id. at 288 (stating that the need for finality of judgments and the
policy of holding clients accountable for the mistakes of counsel preclude vacating default
judgment on the basis of attorney negligence); 165 Adele St., 850 F. Supp. at 538 (asserting
neglect by counsel is insufficient to justify vacating a default judgment because of the need for
finality and the policy of charging attorney errors to the client in civil litigation).
76. Davis v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 532 F.2d 489 (5th Cir. 1976).
77. CJC Holdings, Inc. v. Wright & Lato, 979 F.2d 60 (5th Cir. 1992).
78. Pryor, 769 F.2d at 289.
79. 893 F.2d 1143 (10th Cir. 1990).
80. Id. at 1146.
81. Id. at 1148. The court entered a default judgment on April 10, 1986, almost four
months after the suit was initiated, when plaintiff failed to respond to motions to dismiss and for
summary judgment. Id. at 1144.
82. On May 5, 1986, an attorney appeared on the plaintiffs behalf at a status conference,
explaining that plaintiffs former counsel had failed to respond to defendant's motions because he
was in the process of closing his law practice to start an oil company. Plaintiff also argued it had
never received notice from its prior attorney that the court had granted the motion to dismiss or
entered a default judgment. Id. at 1144-55.
83. According to the court, no unfairness results either from holding a client accountable
for the mistakes of its attorney or from refusing to grant a motion to set aside a default judgment
when the moving party has failed to comply with procedural rules. Id. at 1147.
84. Id. at 1146.
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procedural requirements without good cause, relief under Rule
60(b)(1) was unavailable s
5
These decisions set forth compelling reasons for refusing to
vacate a default judgment that occurs as a result of carelessness or
negligence on the basis of excusable neglect. Nevertheless, the law
remains unsettled in this area and the Supreme Court has yet to
clarify the meaning of "excusable neglect" under Rule 60(b)(1). In
Pioneer Investment Services Co. v. Brunswick Associates Ltd.
Partnership, however, the Supreme Court did resolve the dispute
among the circuits regarding the term's use in the context of
Bankruptcy Rule 9006(b).86 Nevertheless, given the differing goals
and policies of bankruptcies and default judgments, as well as the
internal problems of the Pioneer decision, this decision should not be
extended to Rule 60(b)(1).
IV. THE SUPREME COURT'S INTERPRETATION OF "EXCUSABLE
NEGLECT" UNDER BANKRUPTCY RULE 9006(b)
In a five to four opinion, a sharply divided Court affirmed the
Sixth Circuit's decision adopting a liberal balancing test for excusable
neglect under Bankruptcy Rule 9006(b)(1).7 While the dissent and
the majority drastically disagreed over the proper scope to afford the
term, both opinions focused on the plain meaning of Bankruptcy Rule
9006(b)(1), the intent of Congress, and the policy behind Chapter 11
bankruptcy proceedings in general.88
85. Id. at 1146-47.
86. 507 U.S. 380 (1993).
87. Id. Bankruptcy Rule 9006(b) provides in pertinent part "when an act is required or
allowed to be done at or within a specified period by these rules or by a notice ... the court for
cause shown may at any time in its discretion... permit the act to be done where the failure to
act was the result of excusable neglect." F.R.B.P. 9006(b)(1). The Court "conclude[d] that the
determination [of excusable neglect under Rule 9006(b)] is at bottom an equitable one" and that,
as the Court of Appeals held, all relevant circumstances must be considered, including "the
danger of prejudice to the [opposing party], the length of the delay and its potential impact on
judicial proceedings, the reason for the delay, including whether it was within the reasonable
control of the movant, and whether the movant acted in good faith." Pioneer, 507 U.S. at 395.
88. See Beth Anne Harrill, Note, Equitable Standards of Excusable Neglect: A Critical
Analysis of Pioneer Investment Services Co. v. Brunswick Associates Ltd. Partnership, 11 Bankr.
Dev. J. 181, 196 (1994-1995) (explaining that both the majority and the dissent in Pioneer
focused on the same factors, yet reached different results).
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A. Pioneer Investment Services Co. v. Brunswick Associates
Ltd. Partnership
Pioneer filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition and schedules
designating its creditors.89  These schedules, however, listed as
unliquidated, contingent, or disputed the claims of Brunswick and two
of its related entities, and failed to list at all the claims of another of
Brunswick's related entities (collectively referred to as "Brunswick"). 90
Under relevant bankruptcy law, since Brunswick's claims were
disputed and unlisted, it was required to file proofs of claim in order to
participate in the distribution of Pioneer's estate.91 After receiving
notice of the meeting of the creditors,92 Brunswick hired an attorney
who assured Brunswick that the situation was not urgent because the
court had yet to set the deadline by which time proofs of claim must be
filed.93 By the time counsel discovered that the letter had, in fact,
provided notice of the deadline, Brunswick's proofs of claim were
twenty days late.9 4 Counsel submitted the claims along with a motion
requesting that the court permit the late filing on the basis of
excusable neglect pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 9006(b)(1).95
In affirming the Sixth Circuit decision requiring a liberal read-
ing of "excusable neglect" under Bankruptcy Rule 9006(b),9 the major-
ity relied primarily on three factors.97 First, the Court cited Webster's
89. Pioneer, 507 U.S. at 383.
90. Id.; David A. Riggi, The Supreme Court, in a Bankruptcy Law Decision, Stretches the
' Elastic Concept" of 'Excusable Neglect", 1 Nev. Law. 20, 20 (May 1993). Combined, the four
claims were in excess of $6,000,000. Id.
91. Bankruptcy Rule 3003(c) requires a proof of claim to be filed whenever a claim is
disputed, contingent, unliquidated or unlisted on the debtor's schedule. F.R.B.P. 3003(c)(2). The
creditor is required to file such proof of claim by the deadline established by the courts. F.R.B.P.
3003(c)(3).
92. In bankruptcy, a meeting of the creditors is the time at which "a trustee may be elected
and the debtor examined under oath." Black's Law Dictionary 369 (West, 6th ed. 1990) (defining
"creditors' meeting").
93. Once Brunswick obtained counsel, Brunswick provided him with a full copy of the case
file. Subsequently, both Brunswick and counsel attended a second meeting of the creditors, but
counsel was still unaware the letter had provided notice of the deadline for filing proofs of claim.
Pioneer, 507 U.S. at 384.
94. Id.
95. See note 87. Brunswick's counsel argued that the deadline occurred at a time when he
was withdrawing from his firm and "experiencing 'a major and significant disruption' in his
professional life." Pioneer, 507 U.S. at 384 (quoting the Appellate Opinion).
96. Prior to Pioneer, the circuits were split on the appropriate interpretation of "excusable
neglect" under Bankruptcy Rule 9006(b). Some circuits required the movant to show that the
delay in filing was caused by circumstances beyond its control. Others applied a liberal
balancing test. Id. at 387.
97. The Court made clear, however, that it gave little weight to the fact that Brunswick's
counsel had been experiencing a major upheaval in his professional life at the time of the
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Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary for the plain meaning of "neglect."98
The Court found that the definition establishes the ordinary meaning
of "neglect" and indicates that, because of a lack of evidence to the
contrary, Congress intended courts to accept late filings caused by
mistake, carelessness, inadvertence, or circumstances beyond the
party's control.99 According to the Court, only after a party establishes
its own neglect must a court apply a liberal balancing test to deter-
mine if the conduct is excusable. 100 Second, the Court asserted that
the policies underlying both Chapter 11 and the Bankruptcy Rules
require a flexible understanding of "excusable neglect."101 Finally, the
Court relied on interpretations of "excusable neglect" under Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure 6(b), 13(f), and 60(b)(1) to arrive at a liberal
interpretation of the term.0 2 As the dissent pointedly makes clear,
however, each of these factors is problematic on its own, and in sum,
they create a "solution" that would be both undesirable and unsettling
if courts were to apply it in non-bankruptcy situations.
deadline. In addition, the Court acknowledged the "peculiar and inconspicuous placement" of the
deadline in the notice mailed to Brunswick. Id. at 398.
98. Webster's defines "neglect" as "to give little attention or respect" or "to leave undone or
unattended to espfecially] through carelessness." Pioneer, 507 U.S. at 388 (emphasis in original)
(quoting Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 791 (Merriam-Webster, 1983)).
99. Id.
100. Whether the neglect is excusable turns on "all relevant circumstances surrounding the
party's omission." Id. at 395.
101. The majority asserted the policy behind Chapter 11 is to "provide[ ] for reorganization
with the aim of rehabilitating the debtor and avoiding forfeitures by creditors." Id. at 389. To
accomplish this goal, bankruptcy courts have extensive equitable powers to weigh the interests of
all affected parties. The majority claimed, naturally, that "excusable neglect" under Rule 9006(b)
also entails an equitable inquiry. Id.
102. Because Bankruptcy Rule 9006(b) was modeled after Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
6(b), the Court found case law interpreting Rule 6(b) relevant. Id. at 391-92. Rule 6(b) allows a
court to enlarge the period for performing a specific act when the failure to perform the act
within the original allotted time was the result of excusable neglect. F.R.C.P. 6(b). Courts of
Appeals, according to the majority, have interpreted "excusable neglect" within Rule 6(b) to
include inadvertence. Pioneer, 507 U.S. at 391-92. The Court also considered Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 13(f), which allows late counterclaims to be filed in circumstances of "oversight,
inadvertence, or excusable neglect, or when justice requires." F.R.C.P. 13(f). Given the context
in which "excusable neglect" is used in Rule 13(f), the Court found it "difficult indeed to imagine
that 'excusable neglect' was intended to be limited... :' Pioneer, 507 U.S. at 392. Finally, the
Court differentiated Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1) from 60(b)(6), which allows a court
to vacate a judgment for "any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment."
F.R.C.P. 60(b)(6). The Court reasoned that, because a party must demonstrate extraordinary
circumstances to justify relief under Rule 60(b)(6), a party who is partly at fault must necessarily
seek relief under Rule 60(b)(1). Pioneer, 507 U.S. at 393.
The Court's reliance on Rule 60(b)(6) to interpret Rule 60(b)(1) may be misplaced, however.
The drafters' intent for Rule 60(b)(1) to be more restrictive is evidenced by the strict one year
time limitation for bringing 60(b)(1) actions. Conversely, Rule 60(b)(6) requires only that actions
be brought within a reasonable time period, a far more lenient standard.
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B. Dissent's Concerns
The dissent in Pioneer strongly disagreed with the Court's
adoption of a liberal balancing test to determine the existence of
excusable neglect under Bankruptcy Rule 9006(b).103 According to the
dissent, a bankruptcy court should first determine whether the failure
to meet a deadline was the result of excusable neglect.1 4 Only if the
behavior constitutes excusable neglect should the court consider the
equities involved and decide whether to extend relief under
Bankruptcy Rule 9006(). 105 In support of its position, the dissent
advanced four arguments.
First, the dissent argued the majority failed to follow recent
precedent interpreting Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(b).1 s In
Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation,107 the Court had characterized
the excusable neglect as the greatest obstacle of all and "had focused
only on the respondent's culpability and asserted cause for failing to
file affidavits on time. 1 8 Nowhere in the Lujan opinion had the Court
discussed the equities or the. consequences of the respondent's failure
to file in a timely fashion.0 9
Second, the dissent offered its own plain meaning of "excusable
neglect" from Black's Law Dictionary.110 The dissent argued that,
while the definition from Black's correctly focuses on the cause of the
failure to comply with a deadline and the culpability of the movant,
the definition espoused by the majority considers the results or
consequences of a party's acts."' According to the dissent, only its own
103. Pioneer, 507 U.S. at 399 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
104. Id. at 399-400 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
105. Id. at 400 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
106. Id. at 400-01 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
107. 497 U.S. 871 (1990).
108. Id. at 897.
109. Pioneer, 507 U.S. at 401 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). See Luan, 497 U.S. 871 (making
an excusable neglect determination without discussing the equities or the consequences of the
respondent's actions).
110. Pioneer, 507 U.S. at 402 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). According to Black's, "excusable
neglect" is:
[A] failure to take the proper steps at the proper time, not in consequence of the party's
own carelessness, inattention, or willful disregard of the process of the court, but in
consequence of some unexpected or unavoidable hindrance or accident, or reliance on the
care and vigilance of his counsel or on promises made by the adverse party.
Black's Law Dictionary at 566 (cited in note 92). In a footnote, the majority criticized the dissent
saying "[f]aced with a choice between our own precedent and Black's Law Dictionary, we adhere
to the former" Pioneer, 507 U.S. at 396 n.14.
111. Pioneer, 507 U.S. at 402 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). While the dissent acknowledged
that the Court is not bound by Black's Law Dictionary, it argued that if Congress had intended to
depart from the ordinary, accepted meaning of "excusable neglect" and focus on the effect instead
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approach is consistent with the accepted definition of "excusable
neglect."112
Third, as the dissent correctly claimed, the majority's approach
is circular and renders language in the rule superfluous.113 The dis-
sent recognized that by following the majority's two-part approach,
"excusable neglect" becomes neglect that, in light of all the equities,
the court determines is excusable."m Such a reading is not only
unnatural, according to the dissent, but could have been achieved if
Bankruptcy Rule 9006(b) had given courts the discretion to extend
relief when the failure to comply with a deadline was the result of
"neglect."115 Thus, the majority's approach reads the word "excusable"
directly out of the rule."1
Finally, the dissent stated that the Court's balancing test is
indeterminate and will ultimately lead to wasting resources on unpro-
ductive litigation." 7 Since reasonable individuals often disagree on
what the equities of a given situation require, results will frequently
be called into question. 118 The Pioneer case itself is evidence of this
phenomenon. 19 Two of the three lower courts, while applying virtu-
ally the same test that the Supreme Court ultimately applied, held
that Brunswick had failed to meet the excusable neglect standard. 20
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court majority,
in substituting their own judgment, held otherwise.1
21
of the reason for the error, it would have made its position known. Id. at 403 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
112. Id. at 402 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
113. Id. at 403 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
114. Id.
115. In the dissent's view, since Congress included "excusable," it intended to communicate
that certain types of neglect cannot be forgiven, despite the consequences. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 404, 409 (O'Connor, J., disssenting). See also Harrill, 11 Bankr. Dev. J. at 182
(cited in note 88) ("Pioneer paves the way for unpredictable results and the wasting of precious
time and financial resources in [bankruptcy] 'excusable neglect' litigation."); Frank W. Koger and
Roy B. True, The Final Word on Excusable Neglect?, 98 Com. L. J. 21, 25-6 (1993) (stating that
the dissent's concern that the Court's balancing test will lead to indeterminacy in bankruptcy
cases cannot be denied); Riggi, 1 Nev. Law. at 24 (cited in note 90) (claiming "excusable neglect'
determination under Bankruptcy Rule 9006(b) may create time-consuming and unproductive
bankruptcy appeals).
118. Pioneer, 507 U.S. at 404 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
119. Id.
120. Both the Bankruptcy Court on remand from the District Court and the District Court
on appeal applied a liberal excusable neglect standard and found Brunswick's conduct inexcus-
able. Id. at 385-86.
121. Id. at 404 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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Each of the arguments advanced by the dissent has merit, and
their combined effect seriously calls into doubt the soundness of the
Court's opinion. When considered in conjunction with the differing
goals of default judgments and bankruptcies, as well as several factors
overlooked by the majority, one must inevitably question the appro-
priateness of extending Pioneer and its liberal standard to the deter-
mination of excusable neglect under Rule 60(b)(1). 122
V. REASONS FOR REFUSING TO DEFINE EXCUSABLE NEGLECT
TO INCLUDE MERE CARELESSNESS OR NEGLIGENCE UNDER
RULE 60(b)(1)
Compelling reasons exist for refusing to grant relief under the
excusable neglect standard in Rule 60(b)(1) in cases concerning mere
carelessness or negligence. First, the Pioneer decision is inapplicable
to determinations of excusable neglect under Rule 60(b)(1). The deci-
sion's internal problems, as well as the differing policies and goals of
default judgments and bankruptcies, warrant this conclusion. In addi-
tion, the plain meaning of "excusable neglect" requires a narrow un-
derstanding of the term. Only by recognizing the plain meaning will
courts give meaning to all words in Rule 60(b)(1) and effectuate the
intent of the drafters. Finally, by rejecting requests to vacate default
judgments occurring as a result of mere carelessness or negligence,
courts advance other policies the American legal system has tradition-
ally supported.1'
122. Some courts have applied the Pioneer holding in cases interpreting excusable neglect
under Rule 60(b)(1). See note 124 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court, however, has
declined to state that Pioneer applies in all such cases. In Stutson v. United States, the
applicability of Pioneer to determinations of excusable neglect under Federal Rule of Appellate
Procedure 4(b) was an issue. Stutson v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 600, 602, 133 L. Ed. 571 (1996).
After vacating the judgment below, the Court in Stutson remanded to the Eleventh Circuit to
clarify whether the Court of Appeals had considered Pioneer's applicability in rendering its
decision. Id. at 602-03. Instead of instructing the Court of Appeals on remand that it must apply
Pioneer to the facts at bar, the Court stated that, in the event that the Court of Appeals
concludes that Pioneer does not apply, "it will be useful for us to have the benefit of its views so
that we may resolve the resulting conflict between the Circuits." Id. at 603.
123. The most notable of these policies include ensuring finality of judgments, promoting
judicial efficiency, deterring inappropriate behavior, and holding clients accountable for the
mistakes of their agents. See Part V.C.
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A. Inapplicability of the Pioneer Decision to the Determination of
Excusable Neglect under Rule 60(b)(1)
Courts have been inconsistent in determining whether the
Pioneer decision applies in cases concerning excusable neglect under
Rule 60(b)(1). Some courts have applied the balancing test enunciated
by the Supreme Court,124 while others have made determinations of
excusable neglect in the context of a default judgment without a single
reference to Pioneer.25  Still other courts have questioned the
decision's applicability, while seeming to apply pre-Pioneer law.' 26
Courts either ignoring Pioneer or questioning its applicability
and applying prior circuit law have not indicated their rationale for
doing so. Compelling reasons exist, however, for not extending the
Court's interpretation of excusable neglect under Bankruptcy Rule
9006(b) to cases interpreting excusable neglect under Rule 60(b)(1).
Although the Pioneer Court attempted to buttress its position by
showing that courts have liberally interpreted "excusable neglect" in
the context of other Federal Rules,127 this position is not entirely
accurate. First, some courts have subjected Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 6(b), one of the rules with which the Supreme Court com-
pared Bankruptcy Rule 9006(b), to a strict standard.'28 Courts have
124. See, for example, Cheney v. Anchor Glass Container Corp., 71 F.3d 848, 849 (11th Cir.
1996) (stating that the Supreme Court has clarified the meaning of "excusable neglect" in
Pioneer); Information Systems and Networks Corp. v. United States, 994 F.2d 792, 796 (Fed. Cir.
1993) (choosing to apply the balancing test set forth by the Court in Pioneer); Wolverton v.
Bullock, 1996 WL 254649 at 3 (D. Kan.) (electing to apply the factors set forth by the Supreme
Court in Pioneer to make determination of excusable neglect).
125. See, for example, American Alliance Ins., 92 F.3d 57 (making determination of
excusable neglect without reference to the Pioneer decision); Johnson v. Gudmundsson, 35 F.3d
1104 (7th Cir. 1994) (determining absence of excusable neglect without reference to Pioneer);
United States v. 7108 West Grand Ave., 15 F.3d 632 (7th Cir. 1994) (making no reference to the
Pioneer decision in declining to find existence of excusable neglect); 165 Adelle St., 850 F. Supp.
at 537 (stating neglect is insufficient for finding of excusable neglect without consideration of
Pioneer).
126. See, for example, United States v. RG & B Contractors, Inc., 21 F.3d 952, 956 (9th Cir.
1994) (finding no excusable neglect under Ninth Circuit law, and then stating that there would
still be no excusable neglect if the court assumed for the sake of argument that Pioneer applied);
Associated Business Telephone System, 1995 WL 607545 at 3-4 (finding conduct inexcusable
under Ninth Circuit precedent and then arguing conduct would also be inexcusable under
Supreme Court's balancing test set forth in Pioneer); Guess, 163 F.R.D. at 508 n.6 (stating that
attorney negligence can never provide a basis for Rule 60(b)(1) relief, even though questioning
whether still good law after Pioneer).
127. See note 102 and accompanying text.
128. See, for example, Marane Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 755 F.2d 106, 111 (7th Cir. 1985)
(finding no excusable neglect under Rule 6(b) when attorney claimed unfamiliarity with Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure as excuse for tardiness in filing); Davidson v. Keenan, 740 F.2d 129, 132
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:1619
also strictly construed the excusable neglect standard in both Federal
Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)12 9 and Bankruptcy Rule 8002.130 In
particular, bankruptcy courts have consistently refused to find excus-
able neglect under Bankruptcy Rule 8002 in cases involving attorney
inadvertence or negligence. 3' In addition, not all courts have agreed
that "excusable neglect" under Rule 60(b)(1) requires a liberal inter-
pretation. 132 Finally, the Supreme Court in Lujan referred to the
excusable neglect obstacle as "the greatest of all" and based its
assessment on the movant's culpability and the cause of the failure to
comply, not on the equities or consequences of the failure. 133
Even though these rules all include the phrase "excusable
neglect," they may serve different procedural purposes that bear no
connection to each other.34 The Supreme Court in Pioneer justified its
(2nd Cir. 1984) (finding no excusable neglect under Rule 6(b) when party failed to request an
extension the moment he learned he would be unable to obtain an affidavit within the prescribed
time); McLaughlin v. City of LaGrange, 662 F.2d 1385, 1387 (11th Cir. 1981) (finding no excus-
able neglect under Rule 6(b) when attorney filed motion four days late and claimed preoccupation
with other matters).
129. Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a) provides, in pertinent part, "[a] district court,
upon a showing of excusable neglect or good cause, may extend the time for filing a notice of
appeal...." F.R.A.P. 4(a)(5).
Under Rule 4(a), a court should allow an extention based on excusable neglect in only two
situations: "(1) a finding that the party failed to learn of the entry of judgment, or (2) a finding of
extraordinary circumstances, where excusing the delay is necessary to avoid an injustice."
Harrill, 11 Bankr. Dev. J. at 210 (cited in note 88) (quoting In re Tinnell Traffic Svs., Inc., 43
B.R. 280, 282 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1984)).
130. Bankruptcy Rule 8002 provides, in pertinent part, that a "bankruptcy judge may
extend the time for filing the notice of appeal... upon a showing of excusable neglect:' F.R.B.P.
8002(c).
For cases strictly construing Bankruptcy Rule 8002, see, for example, In re G. General Electro
Components, Inc., 113 B.R. 122, 123 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1990) (stating strict limitations are placed
on trial court in finding excusable neglect under Bankruptcy Rule 8002); In re Dayton Circuit
Court #2, 85 B.R. 51, 54 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1988) (asserting that courts must strictly construe
"excusable neglect" with regard to motions to extend time to appeal bankruptcy orders); Tinnell
Traffic Services, 43 B.R. at 282 (stating that court must apply the strict standard of excusable
neglect when extending time to file an appeal under Bankruptcy Rule 8002(c)).
131. See, for example, In re Intl. Coating Applicators, Inc., 647 F.2d 121 (10th Cir. 1981)
(finding no excusable neglect when attorney could not contact debtor because he mailed letters to
incorrect address); In re Bahre, 30 B.R. 367 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1983) (finding no excusable neglect
when attorney missed deadline because of other trial commitments); In re Smith, 38 B.R. 685
(Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1982) (finding no excusable neglect when attorney filed appeal in wrong
court).
132. See Part III.B.
133. Lujan, 497 U.S. at 897. See notes 107-09 and accompanying text.
134. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(b) and Bankruptcy Rule 9006(b) both regulate a
court's discretion to enlarge the time for performing a specific act when the failure to perform the
act within the original allotted time was the result of excusable neglect. Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 13(f) governs the filing of late counterclaims. Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)
and Bankruptcy Rule 8002 address the court's discretion to permit tardy filings of appeals. See
Harrill, 11 Bankr. Dev. J. at 208 (cited in note 88) (questioning the relevancy of comparing
Bankruptcy Rule 9006 with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 6(b), 13(f), and 60(b)(1)).
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liberal interpretation of "excusable neglect" under Bankruptcy Rule
9006 by arguing the policies underlying Chapter 11 and the
Bankruptcy Rules require it. 135 The Court acknowledged, however,
that the different purpose of a Chapter 7 bankruptcy would preclude
such a liberal construction of the rules governing its proceedings.
136
Therefore, in determining whether to construe "excusable neglect"
liberally under Rule 60(b)(1), the Court seems to imply that one must
consider the goals of the rule, as well as how it interacts with other
policies the legal system has traditionally supported. Although Rule
60(b)(1) is admittedly remedial in nature and reflects a desire to
decide cases on the merits,13 7 the rule should not serve as a shelter for
attorneys or parties who fail to act with due diligence. 138 To condone
such behavior under the excusable neglect standard in Rule 60(b)(1)
would undermine the purpose behind the rule3 9 and threaten
fundamental policies in American jurisprudence such as ensuring
finality of judgments, promoting judicial efficiency, deterring
inappropriate behavior and holding clients accountable for the acts of
their agent.
40
135. The Supreme Court argued that the purpose behind Chapter 11 is reorganization "with
the aim of rehabilitating the debtor and avoiding forfeitures by creditors." To balance these
interests, bankruptcy courts must necessarily exercise broad equitable powers. Pioneer, 507 U.S.
at 389.
136. According to the Court, the purpose of a Chapter 7 liquidation is to close and distribute
the debtor's estate promptly. Consequently, the rules governing Chapter 7 liquidations do not
permit a flexible, liberal approach. Id. at 389.
137. See, for example, Brien v. Kullman Industries, Inc., 71 F.3d 1073, 1077 (2nd Cir. 1995)
(stating a preference for trial on the merits); Meadows, 817 F.2d at 521 (stating that Rule 60(b) is
remedial in nature and should be applied liberally so as to decide cases on the merits when
possible); Johnson v. Garden State Brickface and Stucco Co., 150 B.R. 617, 619 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
1993) (stating that court should resolve doubt in favor of trial on the merits).
138. See, for example, Pryor, 769 F.2d at 287 (stating that Rule 60(b)(1) relief is available
only when a party has acted in constant due diligence with respect to her case); C.KS. Engineers,
726 F.2d at 1205-06 (stating that a party is incapable of establishing excusable neglect when she
has failed to conduct litigation with the degree of diligence and expediency dictated by the trial
court).
139. Rule 60(b) was an attempt to codify and simplify the common law practice of reforming
judgments under special circumstances. Wright, Miller and Kane, 11 Federal Practice &
Procedure § 2851 at 227 (cited in note 2). Surely, the drafters could not have intended to create a
mechanism through which attorneys and parties could disregard process or procedural rules
without consequence.
140. See Parts V.B and V.C.
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B. Plain Meaning of 'Excusable Neglect"
To assert a plain meaning of "excusable neglect" may seem a
bit presumptuous given the dramatic disagreements in the courts over
its meaning. Regardless, one interpretation seems more plausible:
Congress intended the words to be read in unison. On this logic, the
Supreme Court in Pioneer was wrong. While the Court unques-
tionably presented a convincing definition of "neglect,"'' the majority
erred in asserting that a court must first answer the threshold ques-
tion of whether neglect is present before it may assess whether the
neglect is excusable.142 In adopting such an approach, the Court disre-
garded the fact that the rules do not permit a court to extend relief on
the basis of neglect, but only on the basis of "excusable neglect."
Under the Court's analysis the word "excusable" becomes unneces-
sary, as Congress could have achieved the same result by allowing
relief simply on the basis of "neglect.' 4 3  By including the term
"excusable," Congress must have intended to convey that some types
of neglect were simply inexcusable, at least for the purpose of extend-
ing relief under the rules.'"
In addition, through the use of other language, the drafters
built discretion into the rule. Rule 60(b)(1) states, "the court may
relieve a party... for excusable neglect."' 45 The initial inquiry, there-
fore, should be whether the movant has made a showing of excusable
neglect. 46 Only once a court has made this determination should it
exercise its discretion, in light of the equities, and extend or deny
141. The Court adopts Webster's definition, "to give little attention or respect!' or "to leave
undone or unattended to esp[ecially] through carelessness," as the ordinary meaning of "neglect."
Pioneer, 507 U.S. at 388 (quoting Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 791 (cited in note
98)).
142. Under the Supreme Court's analysis, a court must first assess whether a movant has
made a showing of neglect. Only then must the court apply a liberal balancing test to determine
if it is excusable. Id. at 394-95. As the Pioneer dissent notes, however, this approach is circular.
By following the Court's two-part analysis, "excusable neglect" becomes neglect that in light of all
the equities the court determines is excusable. Id. at 403 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). See also
Part IV.B.
143. As the dissent indicates, this approach "reads the word 'excusable' right out of the
Rule" Pioneer, 507 U.S. at 403 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). When possible, however, courts
should avoid rendering language superfluous and adopt an interpretation that gives meaning to
all words in a statute.
144. Otherwise, no justification exists for including "excusable" in the rules. Id. Courts that
read Rule 60(b)(1) strictly adopt this interpretation and assume, at a minimum, that relief is
unavailable for defaults occurring as a result of mere carelessness or negligence, regardless of
the consequences. See Part III.B.
145. F.R.C.P. 60(b)(1) (emphasis added).
146. The dissent advocated this approach in Pioneer. See Part IV.B.
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relief under the rules.147 This interpretation of the plain meaning of
"excusable neglect" gives meaning to all the words in Rule 60(b)(1).
C. Policy Concerns
Courts that narrowly define "excusable neglect" advance other
policies the American legal system has traditionally supported. First,
by adopting a bright-line rule and refusing to vacate default judg-
ments occurring as a result of carelessness or negligence, courts are
better able to achieve finality of judgments. 14 In addition, a narrow
understanding of excusable neglect not only promotes judicial effi-
ciency and the need for clear rules but also deters inappropriate be-
havior. 49 Finally, courts further the policy of holding clients account-
able for the sins of their agents when they interpret "excusable ne-
glect" strictly.15°
1. Ensuring Finality of Judgments
A default judgment's exceptional nature mandates that courts
faced with a motion to vacate carefully balance the competing policies
of a need for finality of judgments and a preference for deciding cases
on the merits.' 51 At some point, however, litigation must be brought to
an end. Finality of judgments is necessary to maintain order and
predictability in the legal process, as well as to allow others to rely in
good faith on a court's decision. Thus, courts should not reopen
judgments on tenuous or insignificant grounds, simply because the
movant so requests. 52 Instead, courts should carefully consider the
147. Pioneer, 507 U.S. at 403 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
148. See Part V.C.1.
149. See Part V.C.2 and V.C.3.
150. See Part V.C.4.
151. See, for example, Seven Elves, Inc. v. Eskenazi, 635 F.2d 396, 402 (5th Cir. 1981)
(stating that, faced with a request for relief under Rule 60(b)(1), a court must balance the
interests of finality and the demands of justice); Bankers Mortgage Co. v. United States, 423 F.2d
73, 77 (5th Cir. 1970) (asserting that provisions of Rule 60(b)(1) must be interpreted so as to
preserve the balance between the "sanctity of final judgments" and the desire that "justice be
done in light of all the facts") (emphasis omitted); Lloyd v. Carnation Co., 101 F.R.D. 346, 347
(M.D.N.C. 1984) (stating that the court must balance the interests of finality and the desire to
decide cases on the merits).
152. While a default judgment is an extraordinary sanction, so too is a grant of a motion to
vacate an extraordinary remedy. Courts should not grant such motions lightly. See, for exam-
ple, Seven Elves, 635 F.2d at 401 (stating that judgments should not be lightly vacated); Geigel v.
Sea Land Service, Inc., 44 F.R.D. 1, 2 (D.P.R. 1968) (stating that courts should not grant motion
for relief on insignificant grounds or judgments will lack finality).
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grounds on which relief is sought. If courts extend relief in cases
concerning carelessness or negligence, they have difficulty in ever
satisfactorily drawing the line of finality again.153 Virtually all errors,
at some level, are a result of carelessness or negligence. 15 4 By
adopting a bright-line rule and declining to vacate default judgments
occurring as a result of carelessness or negligence, however, courts are
better able to draw a clear line of finality with reliable definiteness. 15
2. Promoting Judicial Efficiency
When possible, courts should strive for interpretations that
establish clear rules and promote judicial efficiency. 56 Such an ap-
proach ultimately benefits not only the parties by discouraging the
waste of resources on unproductive appeals, but also the courts by
rendering the law's application easier and more certain.157  The
Supreme Court's Pioneer decision undermines these interests. As the
Pioneer dissent correctly noted, the Court's approach of determining
whether a movant's neglect is. excusable in light of all the equities
creates an indeterminate balancing test whose results will often be
called into question.58 Since reasonable individuals often differ over
what the equities require, Pioneer invites litigants who are unhappy
with a lower court's application of the balancing test to seek a "second
153. See Pryor, 769 F.2d at 288 ("Were this Court to make an exception to finality of
judgment each time a hardship was visited upon the unfortunate client of a negligent or inadver-
tent attorney... courts would be unable to ever adequately redraw that line again, and
meaningful finality of judgment would largely disappear.").
154. For example, ignorance of the law, grounds on which relief can be denied, reflects an
attorney's failure to conduct himself in the manner of a reasonably prudent attorney by keeping
abreast of all relevant laws and regulations. Were courts to grant relief on the basis of careless-
ness or negligence, an attorney or party who had committed a more grievous error for which re-
lief would normally be denied could downplay the error and cast the mistake simply as negligent
behavior. Such a result would undermine the purpose of Rule 60(b)(1).
155. Courts adopting a strict interpretation of "excusable neglect" under Rule 60(b)(1)
recognize the need to accurately draw a line of finality at some point. See, for example, 165 Adele
St., 850 F. Supp. at 538 (stating that to grant relief under Rule 60(b)(1) on the basis of negligence
or carelessness would be an abuse of discretion given the need to draw a clear, objective line of
finality at some point); Pryor, 769 F.2d at 288-289 (asserting that meaningful finality of judg-
ment would disappear if the court were to grant relief under Rule 60(b)(1) on grounds of
negligence).
156. See Griffin v. Swim-Tech Corp., 722 F.2d 677, 680 (11th Cir. 1984) ("The desirability
for order and predictability in the judicial process speaks for caution in the reopening of judg-
ments.").
157. In addition, when courts adopt a clear, bright-line rule, parties are provided with notice
of the standards to which their behavior must conform. See Part V.C.3. Also, bright-line rules
enhance the ability of a non-party to rely on a court's judgment.
158. Pioneer, 507 U.S. at 404 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). While the dissent predicts this
indeterminacy will occur in the bankruptcy context, nothing indicates that the result would be
any different with regard to default judgments.
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opinion" in another court. 159 Not only does this render the law uncer-
tain, but it also wastes the resources of both the parties and the court.
By adopting a stricter standard of excusable neglect and refus-
ing to vacate default judgments occurring as a result of mere careless-
ness or negligence, the problems created by Pioneer are diminished.
At a minimum, a stricter standard fails to condone mere carelessness
or negligence under Rule 60(b)(1), requiring a litigant to make a
stronger initial showing before a court may exercise any discretion in
determining whether to extend relief.16° As a result, the finding of
carelessness or negligence becomes a question of fact, not of law, and
the incentive to seek the "opinion" of a second court significantly
decreases.161 In the end, a stricter standard improves judicial effi-
ciency and wastes fewer resources on unnecessary litigation.
3. Deterring Inappropriate Behavior
Deterring inappropriate behavior is an important premise in
the American legal system.162 In this respect, deadlines and default
judgments play an important role in helping to maintain integrity in
the legal system. While deadlines often give rise to unwelcome
results, they induce individuals to act, 63 and they produce finality.
159. As the dissent indicates, the Pioneer case itself evidences this phenomenon. Although
all four courts rendering a decision in Pioneer applied virtually the same balancing test, two
courts found Brunswick had made a showing of excusable neglect while two did not. Id. at 404
(O'Connor, J., dissenting). Such a result is not one courts should encourage in the context of
default judgments as it undermines both the ability of individuals to rely on decisions and the
need for finality of judgments.
160. Even once a party has made a showing of grounds on which Rule 60(b)(1) allows relief,
a court may still exercise its discretion and refuse to vacate a default judgment if the equities so
require. F.R.C.P. 60(b)(1) (providing that "the court may relieve a party... for.., excusable
neglect") (emphasis added). A plain meaning interpretation of excusable neglect also
necessitates such a conclusion. See Part V.B.
161. The standard for overturning a determination of fact is much higher than the standard
for overturning a determination of law. A reviewing court may overturn a determination of fact
only if it is clearly erroneous. F.R.C.P. 52(a). The dissent in Pioneer notes that none of the
reviewing courts or parties ever suggested that clear error was present. Pioneer, 507 U.S. at 408
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
162. See, for example, Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Trouble with the Adversary System in a
Postmodern, Multicultural World, 38 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 5, 44 n.125 (1996) (commenting that
deterrence is one of the "articulated current goals of [the American] legal system"); Developments
in the Law-Lawyers' Responsibilities and Lawyers' Responses: Shifting the Costs of Liability,
107 Harv. L. Rev. 1651, 1674 (1994) (stating that deterrence is one of "the legal system's
conflicting goals").
163. See Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz, 503 U.S. 638, 644 (1992) ("Deadlines may lead to
unwelcome results, but they prompt parties to act and they produce finality."). See also Carlisle
v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1460, 1468, 134 L. Ed. 2d 613, 627 (1996) (quoting United States v.
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Similarly, a court's power to enter a default judgment prompts all
parties to act and adhere to timetables.164 These tools are important to
ensure that parties who are not earnestly pursuing their cases do not
impede those who are.
Any definition of "excusable neglect" under Rule 60(b)(1) must
be formulated with reference to these principles. Courts that adopt a
liberal interpretation of "excusable neglect" and vacate default judg-
ments on the basis of mere carelessness or negligence fail to take steps
to prevent future negligent behavior by either the attorney or the
client.165 In circuits applying a strict interpretation and refusing to
extend relief on grounds of carelessness or negligence, however, attor-
neys and parties are more likely to exercise the requisite level of
diligence toward their cases. 6 6 The legal system can achieve this
result and prompt attorneys and clients to act in a reasonably prudent
fashion only if it defines "excusable neglect" by focusing on the types of
conduct that should be deterred, and not on the consequences of a
failure to comply with deadlines.
67
4. Holding Clients Accountable for the Sins of Their Agents
Holding clients accountable for the acts and omissions of their
freely selected agents is a long-established policy in American juris-
Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 101 (1985)) ("If 1-day late filings are acceptable, 10-day late filings might be
equally acceptable, and so on in a cascade of exceptions that would engulf the rule erected by the
filing deadline; yet regardless of where the cutoff line is set, some individuals will always fall just
on the other side of it."). Such a statement acknowledges that for deadlines to serve their
purpose and produce finality, courts must enforce them. Otherwise, courts create a slippery
slope problem that they can never effectively eliminate.
164. See United States v. Di Mucci, 879 F.2d 1488, 1495 (7th Cir. 1989) (stating that the
threat of a dismissal is useful in eliciting action from the parties); Sea Land Service, 44 F.R.D. at
2 (stating that the power to invoke sanctions prevents unnecessary delays and avoids congestion
in the dockets). The power to enter a default judgment or dismissal, however, is only effective in
deterring behavior if courts exercise the power when the situation mandates and refuse to vacate
on inappropriate grounds.
165. In this situation, neither the attorney nor the client has much incentive to act in due
diligence with regard to litigation. If either misses a deadline or fails to comply with a discovery
request, for example, relief is available and the party is given another chance.
166. At the very least, the attorneys and parties are on notice of the level of diligence
expected from them.
167. The Supreme Court in Pioneer acknowledged that "excusable neglect" should be
interpreted in such a way as to "deter creditors or other parties from freely ignoring court-
ordered deadlines in the hopes of winning a permissive reprieve under Rule 9006(b)(1)." Pioneer,
507 U.S. at 395. As the dissent noted, however, the approach the Court adopted will not have
this result. If the Court's desire is actually to deter noncompliance, then the focus should be on
the cause of the failure to comply, not on the consequences, which should be irrelevant. Id. at
404 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
1644
1997] NO MORE EXCUSES 1645
prudence. 1 Any other policy would be inconsistent with a system of
representative litigation.169 Consequently, a party is deemed bound by
the acts of his attorney, as well as charged with notice of any fact that
can be charged to her counselY70
This agency law policy supports the proposition that courts
should adopt a strict understanding of "excusable neglect" and hold
clients accountable for the negligent and careless acts of their attor-
neys. Most significantly, the policy serves as a deterrent and induces
both the client and her attorney to act in accordance with a court's
timetable."' If the law were to shield a client from the effects of her
attorney's negligence by permitting courts to vacate default judgments
arising as a result thereof, attorney negligence would become all too
common. 72 Furthermore, a client would actually have an incentive to
stay uninformed of her attorney's actions in the case.173 Holding cli-
ents accountable for the negligent acts of their counsel, however,
maintains integrity of process and ensures negligent parties do not
168. See, for example, id. at 396 (stating that clients must be held accountable for the acts
and omissions of their counsel); Link v. Wabash Railroad Co., 370 U.S. 626, 633-34 (1962)
(holding that acts of a freely-chosen attorney must be charged to petitioner).
169. Link, 370 U.S. at 634.
170. See, for example, Pioneer, 507 U.S. at 396 (stating clients must be held accountable for
the acts and omissions of their counsel); Link, 370 U.S. at 633-34 (holding that acts of freely
chosen attorney must be charged to client); Smith v. Ayer, 101 U.S. 320, 326 (1879) (stating that
a client must be charged with notice of all facts that can be charged to attorney).
Four arguments are generally offered in support of holding clients accountable for the sins of
their attorney. First, a party who voluntarily chooses an attorney as her representative cannot
subsequently escape the consequences of this freely chosen agent. See, for example, Link, 370
U.S. at 633-34 (holding that a client is bound by acts of her freely chosen agent); 7108 West
Grand Ave., 15 F.3d at 634 (stating that under the law of agency, a client is bound by the acts of
her chosen agent). Second, the policy helps to ensure that both attorneys and clients attend to
the case in a reasonably prudent fashion by complying with all deadlines. See id. at 634 (stating
that the policy ensures parties and attorneys take care to comply). Third, the policy aids in
establishing finality of judgments. See Pryor, 769 F.2d at 288-89 (asserting that holding clients
accountable for the negligent errors of their counsel aids in establishing a clear, objective line of
finality). Finally, a truly deserving party who is prejudiced by her attorney's negligence can seek
recourse in a malpractice suit. See, for example, Link, 370 U.S. at 634 n.10 (stating that client's
remedy is against attorney in malpractice suit); Johnson, 35 F.3d at 1117 (noting that truly
innocent litigants may seek remedy in suit for malpractice); Pryor, 769 F.2d at 289 (asserting
proper recourse for client prejudiced by attorney's negligence is malpractice damages).
171. See note 170 and accompanying text.
172. See 7108 West Grand Ave., 15 F.3d at 634 ("If the lawyer's neglect protected the client
from ill consequences, neglect would become all too common. It would be a free good-the
neglect would protect the client, and because the client could not suffer the lawyer would not
suffer either." (quoting Tolliver, 786 F.2d at 319)).
173. So long as any negligent conduct remains solely that of the attorney, relief would still
be available to the client. As a result, clients would have an incentive to inquire only minimally
about their own case.
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prejudice or hinder other litigants.174 Such a policy also encourages
finality of judgments, which allows others to rely in good faith on a
court's judgment.175 Finally, by refusing to vacate a default judgment
occurring as a result of an attorney's carelessness or negligence, a
court would not eliminate the only means of redress available to an
innocent party. An innocent client would still be free to seek damages
in a malpractice action.
176
VI. CONCLUSION
One court has described Rule 60(b) as a "valuable, equitable
and humane" discretionary device that courts have been able to use to
relieve an oppressed party from the burdens of judgments that were
fraudulently, unfairly or mistakenly entered. 77 The court went on to
say, however, that to use the rule to circumvent another rule would be
a perversion of both the rule and its purpose. 78 This view accurately
expresses the role that Rule 60(b)(1) should play in the legal system.
With Rule 60(b), the drafters attempted to both codify and
simplify the equitable common law practice of reforming judgments
under special circumstances. The drafters did not intend the rule to
be, nor should it be, a license for parties and their counsel to disregard
process or procedural rules with impunity, to fail to exercise due
diligence in regard to litigation, or to impede the efforts of other
litigants vigorously pursuing their cases. To condone such behavior
makes a mockery of Rule 60(b) and unduly hinders other policies such
as ensuring finality of judgments, promoting judicial efficiency,
deterring inappropriate behavior, and holding clients accountable for
the sins of their agents.
In this regard, circuits adopting a strict interpretation of
"excusable neglect" recognize that Rule 60(b)(1) was not designed to
excuse all types of error. At a minimum, the rule does not permit a
court to vacate a default judgment occurring as a result of mere negli-
174. By denying relief to parties and attorneys who failed to diligently pursue their own
cause of action, courts would be able to keep their calendars free for parties and attorneys who
were acting in a reasonably prudent fashion. See Johnson, 35 F.3d at 1117 (quoting Stevens v.
Greyhound Lines, Inc., 710 F.2d 1224, 1230 (7th Cir. 1983)) ("[Default judgments are useful in]
ensur[ing] that litigants who are vigorously pursuing their cases are not hindered by those who
are not").
175. See note 170 and accompanying text.
176. See note 170 and accompanying text.
177. Edwards v. Velvac, Inc., 19 F.R.D. 504, 507 (E.D. Wis. 1956).
178. As a result, the court refused to vacate a default judgment on the basis of excusable
neglect when the mbving party had failed to file an appeal within the allotted time. Id.
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gence or carelessness. Only by applying such an understanding of"excusable neglect" can courts sustain the integrity of Rule 60(b)(1),
while at the same time maintaining the delicate balance with other
policies traditionally advanced by the American legal system.
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